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I. INTRODUCTION 
a. Nature of the Case. 
This is the opening brief of the Appellant, Idaho Transportation Department. 
This is a consolidated appeal from two separate administrative actions of the Idaho 
Department of Transportation in regard to Mr. Trottier' s driving privileges. The Department 
suspended Mr. Trottier's driving privileges pursuant to I.C. § 18-8002A, Supreme Court Case 
39994-2012, that suspension is referred to herein as the Administrative License Suspension 
(ALS). 
Additionally, Mr. Trottier has Commercial Driving Privileges which were 
administratively disqualified pursuant to I.C. § 49-335, Supreme Court Case 39949-2012, that 
proceeding is referred to as the Commercial Driver's License Disqualification (CDL DQ). 
b. Party References. 
The Idaho Transportation Department is referred to as the "Department" for purposes of 
this argument. Mr. Trottier is specifically referred to by name. Where "driver" is used, it is in 
reference to a hypothetical or to drivers generally. 
II. ST A TEMENT OF THE CASE - ALS 
a. Factual Statement. 
On September 3, 2011 at 0214 hours Idaho State Police Trooper Schwecke was patrolling 
north bound on U.S. Highway 95 in the city limits of Moscow, Idaho and observed a red GMC 
Jimmy conduct a right hand turn from C Street onto Highway 95 failing to properly maintain his 
lane of travel and driving on top of the lane divider and hash marks for approximately 20 to 30 
feet. 
Trooper Schwecke activated his emergency overhead lights and conducted a traffic stop. 
Idaho State Police Corporal Baldwin assisted. 
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Upon approaching the vehicle and informing the driver of the reason for the stop, 
Trooper Schwecke could smell the odor of an alcoholic beverage coming from the vehicle. The 
driver, later identified as William R. Trottier, had glassy and bloodshot eyes. 
Mr. Trottier admitted to having a couple of beers and Trooper Schwecke asked Mr. 
Trottier to perform standardized field sobriety tests. 
Mr. Trottier performed the Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus, the Walk and Tum and One Leg 
Stand tests and failed the tests. Trooper Schwecke informed Mr. Trottier that he would be 
detained for suspicion of driving under the influence of alcohol. 
Trooper Schwecke initiated a 15 minute monitoring period and obtained breath samples 
from Mr. Trottier receiving alcohol breath test results of .148 and .144. Trooper Schwecke then 
arrested Mr. Trottier and Mr. Trottier was transported to the Latah County Jail (R. pp. 032-033). 
b. Procedural History. 
Mr. Trottier asked the Idaho Transportation Department for a hearing on a proposed 
Administrative License Suspension pursuant to LC. § 18-8002A(7) for his failure of an 
evidentiary test for breath alcohol concentration. The Department's Hearing Examiner, Skip 
Carter determined that the requirements for suspension of Mr. Trottier's driving privileges set 
forth in Idaho Code § 18-8002A were complied with and Mr. Trottier should have his driving 
privileges suspended for ninety days as a result of failing an evidentiary test for alcohol 
concentration. 
Mr. Trottier requested that the District Court review the decision of the Department's 
Administrative Hearing Examiner. 
Upon Judicial Review, the District Court set aside the decision of the Department's 
Hearing Examiner, concluding that Mr. Trottier demonstrated that the stop of his vehicle was not 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 2 
supported by legal cause. 
The Department timely filed its appeal. 
c. Reference to the Administrative Record. 
The references to the Department's Administrative Record are made to the Appellate 
Record page number not the Administrative Record page number. The Transcript of the 
Administrative hearing is included in the Record on Appeal as an exhibit. The transcript of that 
hearing is referred to as the Administrative License Suspension Transcript (ALS Tr.) by page 
and number. A video recording of the circumstances of the administration of breath alcohol 
testing was made an Exhibit to the Administrative Record and is referred to as ALS Exhibit A. 
III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE- CDL 
a. Factual Statement and Procedural History. 
Mr. Trottier was notified on September 13, 2011 that the Idaho Transportation 
Department intended to disqualify him from the continued operation of Commercial Motor 
Vehicles for life as a result of several failures of evidentiary testing for breath alcohol (CDL DQ 
R. p. 022). 
Mr. Trottier timely requested a hearing with the Idaho Department of Transportation's 
Hearing Examiner (CDL DQ R. pp. 025-026) on the proposed Commercial Driver's License 
Disqualification. 
A hearing was held telephonically on October 11, 2011 (CDL DQ R. p. 029). 
Mr. Trottier timely filed a Petition for Judicial Review (CDL DQ R. pp. 047-048). 
Upon the District Court setting aside the ALS, the CDL DQ was also set aside (CDL DQ 
R. p. 129-131). 
The Department timely filed its appeal. 
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b. Reference to the Administrative Record. 
The references to the Department's Administrative Record are made to the Appellate 
Record page number not the CDL DQ Administrative Record page number. The Transcript of 
the CDL DQ Administrative hearing is included in the Record on Appeal as an exhibit and is 
referred to as the CDL DQ Transcript. 
IV. ISSUES ON APPEAL 
A. ALS 
1. The District Court erred when it determined that Mr. Trottier had met his burden to show 
that legal cause did not exist for the stop of Mr. Trottier. 
B. CDL DQ 
1. The CDL DQ is appropriate pursuant to LC. § 49-335. 
V. ST AND ARD OF REVIEW 
Idaho Code § 18-8002A(7) sets out the burden of the driver to demonstrate to the Hearing 
Examiner that driving privileges should be reinstated because: 
(a) The peace officer did not have legal cause to stop the person; or 
(b) The officer did not have legal cause to believe the person had been driving or 
was in actual physical control of a vehicle while under the influence of 
alcohol, drugs or other intoxicating substances in violation of the provisions of 
section 18-8004, 18-8004C or 18-8006, Idaho Code; or; 
( c) The test results did not show an alcohol concentration or the presence of drugs 
or other intoxicating substances in violation of section 18-8004, 18-8004C or 
18-8006, Idaho Code; or 
( d) The tests for alcohol concentration, drugs or other intoxicating substances 
administered at the direction of the peace officer were not conducted in 
accordance with the requirements of section 18-8004( 4), Idaho Code, or the 
testing equipment was not functioning properly when the test was 
administered; or 
( e) The person was not informed of the consequences of submitting to evidentiary 
testing as required in subsection (2) of this section. 
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The burden of proof rests on the driver to prove any of the grounds to vacate the suspension of 
Idaho Code § 18-8002A(7), Kane v. State, Dept. of Transp., 139 Idaho 586, 83 P.3d 130 at 143 (Ct. 
App. 2003). 
The disqualification of Mr. Trottier' s Commercial Driving Privileges is addressed in Idaho Code 
§ 49-335(4): 
A person is disqualified for the period of time specified in 49 CFR part 3 83 if 
found to have committed two (2) or more of any of the offenses specified in 
subsection (1) or (2) of this section, or any combination of those offenses, arising 
from two (2) or more separate incidents. 1 
The review of disputed issues of fact must be confined to the agency record for judicial 
review. Idaho Code§ 67-5277. 
1 
Idaho Code§ 49-335 (I) & (2) provides: 
(I) Any person who operates a commercial motor vehicle or who holds a class A, B or C driver's 
license is disqualified from operating a commercial motor vehicle for a period of not less than one 
(I) year if convicted in the form of a judgment or withheld judgment of a first violation under any 
state or federal law of: 
(a) Operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or a controlled 
substance; 
(b) Operating a commercial motor vehicle while the alcohol concentration of the person's 
blood, breath or bodily substance is 0.04 or more; 
(c) Leaving the scene of an accident involving a motor vehicle driven by the person; 
(d) Using a motor vehicle in the commission of any felony; 
( e) Operating a commercial motor vehicle when the person's class A, B or C commercial 
driver's license driving privileges were revoked, suspended or canceled, or during a time 
when such person was disqualified from operating a commercial motor vehicle, if the 
reason for such revocation, suspension, cancellation or disqualification was the result of a 
violation that occurred while the person was operating a commercial motor vehicle; 
(f) Causing a fatality through negligent operation of a commercial motor vehicle, 
including, but not limited to, the crimes of motor vehicle manslaughter, homicide by 
motor vehicle and negligent homicide. 
(2) Any person who operates a commercial motor vehicle or who holds a class A, B or C driver's 
license is disqualified from operating a commercial motor vehicle for a period of not less than one 
(I) year if the person refuses to submit to or submits to and fails a test to determine the driver's 
alcohol, drug or other intoxicating substances concentration while operating a motor vehicle. 
See also Appendix 1, copy of 49 CFR 3 83 .51 
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Idaho Code § 67-5279(1) sets out the scope of review. "The Court shall not substitute its 
judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact." Howard 
v. Canyon County Bd. of Com 'rs, 128 Idaho 479, 915 P. 2d 709 (1996). 
Idaho Code § 67-5279(3) provides: 
When the agency was required by the provisions of this chapter or by other 
provision of law to issue an order, the court shall affirm the agency action unless 
the court finds that the agency's findings, inferences, conclusions or decisions are: 
(a) in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions; 
(b) in excess of the statutory authority of the agency; 
( c) made upon unlawful procedure; 
( d) not supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole; or 
(e) arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. 
The appropriate remedy pursuant to the Idaho Administrative Procedures Act is: " ... if 
the agency action is not affirmed, it shall be set aside, in whole or in paii and remanded for 
further proceedings as necessary." Idaho Code § 67-5279(3). 
The decision of the Transportation Department must be affirmed unless the order violates 
statutory or constitutional provisions, exceeds the agency's authority, is made upon unlawful 
procedure, is not supported by substantial evidence or is arbitrary, capricious or an abuse of 
discretion, Marshall v. Department of Transp., 137 Idaho 337, 48 P.3d 666 (2002). The party 
challenging the agency decision must demonstrate that the agency erred in a manner specified in 
Idaho Code§ 67-5279(3) and that a substantial right of that party has been prejudiced. Druffel v. 
State, Dept. ofTransp., 136 Idaho 853, 41P.3d739 (2002). 
Appellate review of the District Court's decision requires the Court to review "the 
agency record independently of the District Court's decision", Marshall v. Dept. of Transp. 137 
Idaho 337, 340, 48 P.3d 666,669 (Ct. App. 2002). 
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V.ARGUMENT 
A. The Administrative License Suspension 
The District Court erred when it determined that Mr. Trottier had met his burden to show 
that legal cause did not exist for the stop of Mr. Trottier. 
I.C. § 18-8002A(7) requires that the driver show that there was no legal cause to stop the 
vehicle operated by him. The Department's Hearing Examiner concluded that legal cause 
existed to stop Mr. Trottier for a violation of I.C. § 49-644(1) or a violation of I.C. § 49-637 for 
failing to maintain its lane of traffic. 2 
The appellate court reviews the Hearing Examiner's Decision independently of the 
District Court to determine whether Mr. Trottier met his burden before the Department's Hearing 
Examiner.3 
2 I.C. 49-644(1) provides: 
The driver of a vehicle intending to tum shall do so as follows: Both the approach for a right tum 
and the right tum shall be made as close as practicable to the right-handed curb or edge of the 
roadway. 
3 
In reviewing the district court, this Court examines the county board of commissioners' record independently of 
the district court's decision. Marcia T Turner, L.L. C. v. City of Twin Falls, 144 Idaho 203, 207, 159 P. 3d 840, 844 
(2007). A reviewing court must affirm the county board of commissioners' action unless the board's decision (a) 
violates statutory or constitutional provisions; (b) exceeds the statutory authority of the board; (c) is made upon 
unlawful procedure; (d) is not supported by substantial evidence in the record; or (e) is arbitrary, capricious, or an 
abuse of discretion. Id. at 208, 159 P.3d at 845; I.C. § 67-5279(3). 
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The Department's Hearing Examiner's findings as to the existence of legal cause for the 
stop are supported by substantial evidence in the Record as a whole.4 
The Hearing Examiner concluded that the video recording of the circumstances of the 
stop of Mr. Trottier (ALS Exhibit A) demonstrates that Mr. Trottier's vehicle made "a wide turn 
crossing over both of the dashed lane dividers" (R. p. 036 Finding 1.2). Such a fact is clearly 
observable by viewing ALS Exhibit A. 5 
Mr. Trottier simply asks the Court to come to a conclusion different from that made by 
the Hearing Examiner considering the same information. Here, the Hearing Examiner did not 
hear from Mr. Trottier as to his driving. There is no differing testimony which the Hearing 
Officer is required to weigh, Bennett v. State, Dept. of Transp., 147 Idaho 141, 206 P.3d 505 
(Ct.App. 2009). Mr. Trottier simply argues without supporting testimony that the Affidavit of 
Trooper Schwecke and the video recording is insufficient to support a finding that legal cause 
did not exist to stop Mr. Trottier's vehicle. 
1. 
Was There Legal Cause to Stop the Vehicle Driven By The Petitioner? 
I. Officer Schwecke stopped the vehicle driven by Trottier on September 3, 2011 at approximately 0214 hours 
in Latah County, Idaho for an illegal turn, in violation of Idaho Code, § 49-644, and for failing to maintain 
its lane of travel, in violation of Idaho Code,§ 49-637. 
2. Counsel for Trottier argues that no traffic violation can be discerned from a viewing of the driving on video 
recording. However, only part of the driving pattern occurs within view of the camera on the recording. 
Additionally, what can be see appears to be a wide turn, crossing over the dashed lane dividers. The paint 
on the dashed lane dividers is faded but still discernible. 
3. Officer Schwecke had legal cause to stop the vehicle driven by Trottier. 
(ALS R. p. 061) 
5 It is appropriate for the Administrative Hearing Examiner to have made common sense judgments and inferences 
about human behavior even though he does not set those out in his Findings, Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 at 
125, 120S.Ct. 673 (2000). 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 8 
The analysis of legal cause in the Administrative License Suspension setting is discussed 
by the Court of Appeals in the In re Suspension of Driver's License ofGibbar, 143 Idaho 937, 
155P.3d1176 (Ct. App. 2006). 6 
Trooper Schwecke clearly has a reasonable and articulable suspicion for the stop of Mr. 
Trottier' s vehicle based upon the observed driving and driving recorded with his onboard video 
recording equipment (ALS Exhibit A). 7 
The conduct observed by Trooper Schwecke does not fall within the broad range of what 
can be described as normal driving behavior given the statutory provisions of LC. § 49-644(1 ). 
It is clear from the video recording that Mr. Trottier did not approach a right hand turn 
and make a right hand turn as close as practicable to the right hand curb or edge of the roadway 
as required by LC. § 49-644. 
The lack of testimony from Mr. Trottier does not offer for the Administrative Hearing 
Examiner a potential factual alternative explanation as to why it was not "practicable" for Mr. 
Trottier to make a turn as close to the right hand curb or edge of the roadway, In re Gib bar at p. 
A traffic stop by an officer constitutes a seizure of the vehicle's occupants and implicates the 
Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. Delaware v. Prouse, 
440 U.S. 648, 653, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 1395-96, 59 L.Ed.2d 660, 667 (1979); State v. Atkinson, 128 
Idaho 559, 561, 916 P.2d 1284, 1286 (Ct.App.1996). Under the Fourth Amendment, an officer 
may stop a vehicle to investigate possible criminal behavior ifthere is a reasonable and articulable 
suspicion that the vehicle is being driven contrary to traffic laws. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 
411, 417, 101 S.Ct. 690, 694-95, 66 L.Ed.2d 621, 628-29 (1981); State v. Flowers, 131 Idaho 
205, 208, 953 P.2d 645, 648 (Ct.App.1998). The reasonableness of the suspicion must be 
evaluated upon the totality of the circumstances at the time of the stop. State v. Ferreira, 133 
Idaho 474, 483, 988 P.2d 700, 709 (Ct.App.1999). 
In re Suspension of Driver's License ofGibbar, 143 Jdaho 937, 942-43, 155 P.3d 1176, 1181-82 (Ct. App. 2006). 
7 The time of night, 2:20 a.m. and the neighborhood in which the stop occurred are also circumstances from which 
Trooper Schwecke could draw based upon his experience as a Patrol Officer demonstrating a reasonable and 
articulable suspicion that the vehicle is being driven contrary to traffic laws. 
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948). Instead Mr. Trottier simply asks the Court to come to a contrary factual conclusion to that 
made by the Administrative Hearing Examiner. 
Trooper Schwecke's suspicion that the operator of the motor vehicle immediately in front 
of him has "committed or is about to commit to a crime" does not require Trooper Schwecke to 
follow Mr. Trottier to develop more legal cause than Trooper Schwecke has at his disposal. 
Trooper Schwecke observes a motor vehicle making an inappropriate right hand turn not as close 
as practicable to the right hand curb or edge of the roadway. 8 
The Hearing Examiner's decision is based on such relevant evidence that a reasonable 
mind might accept to support his conclusion, Masterson v. Idaho Dept. of Transp., 150 Idaho 
126, 244 P.3d 625 (Ct. App. 2010). 9 
The Hearing Examiner's Decision is based on something more than a "scintilla but less 
than a preponderance" (Masterson at 627). The District Court's standard of judicial review here 
eliminates the appropriate deference to the factual analysis and conclusions of the Department's 
Hearing Examiner, I.C. § 67-5277. The District Court's standard of Judicial Review does not 
offer judicial review of the Hearing Examiner's Decision instead the Court substitutes its own 
factual findings for those of the Hearing Examiner, LC. § 67-5279(1). 
8 
Here, there is probable cause for the stop of Mr. Trottier's motor vehicle based upon the video recording and 
consistent with Trooper Schwecke's observation that Mr. Trottier made a turn inconsistent with that required of him 
pursuant to I.C. § 49-644(1). See Gibbar, 143 Idaho 937, 942-43, 155P.3d1176, 1181-82 (Ct. App. 2006). 
In other words, the agency's factual determinations are binding on the reviewing court, even where 
there is conflicting evidence before the agency, so long as the determinations are supported by 
substantial and competent evidence in the record. Urrutia v. Blaine County, ex rel. Ed. of 
Comm'rs, 134 Idaho 353, 357, 2 P.3d 738, 742 (2000); Marshall, 137 Idaho at 340, 48 P.3d at 669. 
Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept to support a 
conclusion. Kinney v. Tupperware Co., 117 Idaho 765, 769, 792 P.2d 330, 334 (1990). Substantial 
evidence is more than a scintilla, but less than a preponderance. Id. 
Masterson v. Idaho Dept. ofTransp., 150Idaho126, 128, 244 P.3d 625, 627 (Ct. App. 2010) 
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Here, the Decision of the Hearing Examiner has a factual basis, however, the District 
Court instead of reviewing that factual basis through the prism of deference to the Hearing 
Examiner, the District Court conducts its own factual analysis contrary to I.C. § 67-5279. The 
findings made by the District Court on the record clearly substitute the Court's factual finding 
for the Hearing Examiner's factual findings (Tr. p. 40 LL. 20-24). 
The Hearing Examiner indicates that he observed what he characterized as a wide turn 
and that the paint on the lane dividers was faded but still discernible (ALS R. p. 61). 
The Hearing Examiner finding that Mr. Trottier made a wide turn and that the paint on 
the lane dividers was faded but observable are appropriate findings from Trooper Schwecke's 
sworn statement (ALS R. p. 031-034). There is no contrary testimony. Those findings are also 
appropriate based upon the review of the video recording (ALS Exhibit A). 
The District Court only applies IC § 49-63 7 to the facts of the stop of Mr Trottier (Tr. p. 
40 LL. 13-20). The Court does not analyze the application of I.C. § 49-644 to these facts. 
Trooper Schwecke indicates in his sworn statement that he is making a traffic stop based on the 
inappropriate tum onto Main Street by Mr. Trottier. 
It is clear from the videotape that Mr. Trottier's vehicle is in the middle of Main Street, 
demonstrating that Mr. Trottier did not make a right tum staying as close to the right-hand curb 
as is practicable (ALS Exhibit A at 2:10:33). 
The analysis of the District Court does not fulfill the District Court's role of judicial 
review, I.C. § 67-5279. Instead the Court is making its own factual determination not 
considering whether there is more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance of evidence 
supporting the Hearing Examiner's Findings. 
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Just as Mr. Trottier can argue that he can't see a wide turn and a return to his lane of 
travel by reviewing the video tape, another person looking at the same videotape can conclude 
that Mr. Trottier's vehicle is in the middle of Main Street not in the curbside lane as required by 
LC. § 49-644. That differing view indicates that there is more than a scintilla of evidence. ' 0 
The District Court instead of determining whether there is a basis in the Record for the 
Hearing Examiner's conclusion, makes his own conclusion. 11 
The Court suggests that the painted lane dividers are not clearly marked because others 
have driven in the way that Trooper Schwecke observes Mr. Trottier drove and concludes that if 
everybody is doing it then it's not suspicious behavior outside the range of normal driving. 
JO 
" When we review the record to determine whether substantial evidence exists we are precluded 
from substituting our judgment for that of the fact finder as to the credibility of witnesses, the 
weight of testimony, and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence."). 
See State v. Bettwieser, 143 Idaho 582, 588, 149 P.3d 857, 863 (Ct.App.2006). 
II 
21 The DVD shows Mr. Trottier driving out of the 
22 parking lot around the pickup that is nearest to the curb in 
23 what looks to me to be as practicable as possible way. I 
24 don't see him driving over the centerline. 
Tr. of Appellate Argument p. 40 LL. 21-24 
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Instead of the appropriate deference that should be given the Hearing Examiner's 
Decision, the District Court considers information that is clearly not part of the Record, clearly 
has not been argued by Mr. Trottier and was not considered by the Department's Hearing 
Examiner. 12 
Clearly the Court is substituting its judgment for the judgment of the Hearing Examiner. 
There is no evidence in the Record that the condition of the painted lane dividers law makers in 
any way attributable to the operation of a motor vehicle contrary to LC. § 49-637 or LC. § 49-
644. 
The question is not what the District Court can see, the question is what the Hearing 
Examiner saw. If there is a reasonable basis in the record for the Hearing Examiner's findings 
then the District Court must give deference to the Hearing Examiner's Decision. LC. § 67-5279. 
The Hearing Examiner indicated what testimony he considered, how he made this decision and 
circumstances of his conclusion accepting Trooper Schwecke's sworn statement along with his 
view of the videotape to conclude that Mr. Trottier did not meet his burden to show that Officer 
Schwecke did not have legal cause for the motor vehicle stop. 13 
Put another way, Hearing Examiner's findings indicate what information the Hearing 
Examiner considered, what weight was placed on that evidence by the Hearing Examiner and 
how the Hearing Examiner deliberated to the conclusions made by him. The Hearing Examiner 
12 
8 ... And to the extent that they're not clearly 
9 marked, it suggests to me that others drove in the way that 
I 0 Schwecke thinks that Mr. Trottier drove and therefore if 
11 everybody is doing it, it's not a reasonable and articulable 
12 suspicious behavior that would justify being stopped. 
Tr. p. 41 LL. 8-12. 
13 The Court of Appeals recently, even after finding that some of the Department's Hearing Examiner's Findings 
were not supported by the Record concluded that the driver had not met her burden, In re Hubbard, 152 Idaho 879, 
276 P.3d 751 (Ct. App. 2012). 
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clearly made factual determinations supported by the Record and which are binding on the 
reviewing Court. Urrutia v. Blaine County, 134 Idaho 353, 357, 2 P.3d 738, 742 (2000), 
Marshall v. Department ofTransp. 137 Idaho 337, 48 P.3d 666 (Ct. App. 2002). 
If the argument is that the Video recording is an inconclusive demonstration of whether 
Mr. Trottier actually made a right tum that did not stay as close as practical to the right curb 
edge, the record still contains the umefuted sworn statement of Trooper Schwecke of his 
observations and Mr. Trottier has not met his burden. 
The Department's Hearing Examiner's conclusion that Trooper Schwecke had legal 
cause to stop the vehicle operated by Mr. Trottier is supported by substantial evidence in the 
Record. If the video recording is inconclusive then Mr. Trottier has not met his burden to show 
that there was not legal cause for the stop of Mr. Trottier. 
The District Court erred when it set aside the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
and Decision of the Department's Hearing Examiner. The District Court is required to consider 
the Record that exists and not substitute its opinion for the opinion of the Department's Hearing 
Examiner. When the District Court does so, this Court on appeal is free to determine whether 
there is sufficient evidence in the Record to support the Hearing Examiner's Decision. 
Other issues were raised by Mr. Trottier below. Specifically the District Court did not 
reach the question of whether the tests for alcohol concentration were satisfactorily administered 
by Officer Schwecke. 
The Hearing Examiner's Decision is supported by substantial competent evidence in the 
Record and should be sustained. 
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B. Commercial Driver's License Disqualification 
Mr. Trottier argued before the Idaho Transportation Department's Hearing Examiner that 
Mr. Trottier should be entitled to the benefit of the stay of the Commercial Driver's License 
Disqualification administrative action as a result of the Stay entered by the District Court in the 
judicial review of Mr. Trottier' s Administrative License Suspension. Mr. Trottier further argued 
to the Hearing Examiner that the Idaho Transportation Department was in violation of the 
Court's stay entered in Mr. Trottier's Judicial Review of the Administrative License Suspension 
of Mr. Trottier's driving privileges when proceeding to disqualify Mr. Trottier's Commercial 
Driving Privileges in a separate administrative process. 
Mr. Trottier asked the District Court to take Judicial Notice of the Court's proceedings 
and file in the Judicial review of the Administrative License Suspension of Mr. Trottier's driving 
privileges. 
The District Court did not reach any of the arguments made to the Department's Hearing 
Examiner, concluding that since the ALS suspension was set aside there was no basis for a 
lifetime disqualification pursuant to I.C. § 49-335(2). 14 
This Court on appeal reviewing the Administrative Record de novo can determine 
whether the CDL DQ Hearing Examiner acted properly, Marshall. 
The question pursuant to I.C. § 49-335(4) is whether Mr. Trottier has Commercial 
Driving Privileges, whether he had recently failed an evidentiary test for blood alcohol and 
whether he had suffered a prior evidentiary test failure. The Hearing Examiner specifically finds 
14 lfthe District Court was persuaded that the Department had violated its stay order, the District Court would have 
addressed that "contemptible behavior". 
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that Mr. Trottier has commercial driving privileges and had failed two evidentiary tests (R. p. 
042). 15 
There is no evidence submitted to the Hearing Examiner that Mr. Trottier did not fail the 
pnor evidentiary test in Washington or that he did not suffer an unvacated Administrative 
License Suspension at the time of the CDL DQ Administrative Hearing. 
It is not a violation of due process for the Hearing Examiner m disqualifying Mr. 
Trottier's Commercial Driving privileges to make a decision based on the Department's Record 
(IDAPA 04.11.01.600). 
At the time of the CDL DQ Hearing there was no showing by Mr. Trottier that the 
Administrative License Suspension pursuant to J.C. § 18-8002A had been vacated. 
Mr. Trottier argues that the Department's conduct of an Administrative Hearing in 
connection with Mr. Trottier' s Commercial Driving Privileges is in violation of the Stay entered 
in an entirely different case where Mr. Trottier requested Judicial Review of an Administrative 
License Suspension pursuant to LC. § 18-8002A. Clearly, there is nothing in the language of the 
Stay in the Administrative License Suspension case that prohibits the Department from taking 
any other action in connection with Mr. Trottier' s driving privileges other than the consequences 
he would suffer under the Administrative License Suspension. 16 
The Department does not violate the Court's stay in the Judicial Review of the 
Administrative License Suspension of Mr. Trottier's Driving Privileges when it proceeds to 
15 
Records of the Department demonstrates that respondent failed a test to determine the driver's 
alcohol concentration administered by a police officer on or about July 2, 2009, the State of 
Washington and again on September 3, 2011, in Latah County, State ofldaho. All of the incidents 
were while the respondent was operating a non-commercial vehicle. 
Findings ofFact, Conclusions of Law and Preliminary Order,~ 1, p. 1, Rp. 042. 
16 For example, if Mr. Trottier had suffered a reckless driving conviction pursuant to LC. § 49-1501 would Mr. 
Trottier argue that the Department could not independently suspend Mr. Trottier's Driving Privileges. 
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address the unique driving privileges Mr. Trottier has as a Commercial Driver. The Idaho Court 
has clearly indicated that the Commercial Driving Privileges Disqualification action is separate 
and distinct from the Administrative License Suspension action, Wanner v. State, Dept. of 
Transp. 150 Idaho 164, 244 P.3d 1250 (2011), Buell v. Idaho Dept. of Transp. 151 Idaho 257, 
254P.3d1253 (2011). 
The Court does not stay the Idaho Transportation Department from additional 
proceedings involving Mr. Trottier's driving privileges in the Administrative License Suspension 
case, only the implementation of the Administrative License Suspension as a result of the failed 
evidentiary test is stayed. Any subsequent action by the Idaho Transportation Department 
regarding the Disqualification of Mr. Trottier's Commercial driving privileges should proceed. 
In particular, the Legislature has addressed what can be considered by the Department for 
purposes of the Commercial Driving Privileges disqualification: 
For purposes of disqualification or withdrawal of commercial vehicle driving 
privileges only, "conviction" means an unvacated adjudication of guilt, or 
determination that a person has violated or failed to comply with the law in a 
court of original jurisdiction or by an authorized administrative tribunal, an 
unvacated forfeiture of bail or collateral deposited to secure the person's 
appearance in court, a plea of guilty or nolo contendere accepted by the court, the 
payment of a fine or court cost, or violation of a condition of release without bail, 
regardless of whether or not the penalty is rebated, suspended or probated. 
(Emphasis added.) 
Idaho Code§ 49-104(14)(b). 17 
There is no violation of the Court's stay in the LC. § l 8-8002A Administration License 
Suspension Judicial Review as a result of the Department's proceeding with the disqualification 
of Mr. Trottier's privileges to operate a commercial vehicle pursuant to LC.§ 49-335. 
17 Should the Court vacate the Administrative License Suspension, pursuant to the definition of conviction, the 
Department would not have two "convictions" for purposes of a lifetime disqualification of Mr. Trottier's privileges 
to operate a Commercial Vehicle. 
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Neither is there a procedural due process violation. Mr. Trottier received "an opportunity 
to be heard at a meaningful time in a meaningful manner" Mathews v. Eldridge 424 US. 319 at 
333 (1976). There are sufficient procedural protections in place based upon the process provided 
Mr. Trottier regarding the disqualification of Mr. Trottier's privileges to operate a Commercial 
Motor Vehicle. 18 
Here Mr. Trottier was given notice of a hearing, had competent counsel appear on his 
behalf and was aware of what information had been provided by the Department for purposes of 
creating the initial Record. 
The Mathews standard is clearly met with the Department providing Mr. Trottier with a 
hearing before a neutral and disinterested Hearing Examiner. 19 
The balancing required of the Mathews factors clearly indicates no procedural deficiency. 
The private interest here is Mr. Trottier' s Commercial Driving Privileges. There is little risk of 
an "erroneous deprivation" based on the process provided Mr. Trottier. Mr. Trottier offers no 
additional procedural safeguards for the Court's consideration. Mr. Trottier argues for a 
different process requiring considerable time between the Administrative License Suspension 
pursuant to I.C. § 18-8002A and the Commercial Driving Privileges pursuant to I.C. § 49-335. 
Specifically, the Idaho Court has never found the Department's administrative hearing 
process to be constitutionally suspect, In re Suspension of Driver's License of Gibbar, 143 Idaho 
18 
Due process generally requires consideration of three distinct factors: First, the private interest that 
will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest 
through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural 
safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal 
and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail. 
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335, 96 S. Ct. 893, 903, 47 L. Ed 2d 18 (1976). 
19 No challenge has been made the that Hearing Examiner was biased or otherwise unduly influenced. 
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937, 155 P.3d 1176 (Ct. App. 2006), also see Wanner v. State, Dept. of Transp. 150 Idaho 164, 
244 P.3d 1250 (2010), Buell v. Idaho Dept. ofTransp. 151 Idaho 257, 254 P.3d 1253 (2011) and 
most recently In re Williams, --- P.3d ---, 2012 WL 3068793.20 
The Hearing Examiner was not encouraged to come to a different conclusion and was not 
presented evidence or authority as to why the Hearing Examiner should not rely on the Idaho 
Transportation Department's Records that prior evidentiary tests for breath alcohol had been 
failed by Mr. Trottier. 
The Public interest implicated here is substantial. The Idaho Courts considering the 
Mathews factors in the context of Administrative License Suspension hearings have found a 
substantial public interest, Bell v. Idaho Transp. Dept. 151 Idaho 659, 262 P.3d 1030 (2011). 21 
Further, the Department has an interest in the implementation of its governing statutes. 
Mr. Trottier really just makes a policy argument that the Idaho Transportation 
Department should not disqualify Mr. Trottier from the operation of a Commercial Motor 
20 The Court recently determined that the lifetime CDL DQ process does not violate due process and is not cruel and 
unusual punishment, Jn re Williams, --- P.3d ---, 2012 WL 3068793. 
21 
Idaho's appellate courts have considered the Mathews factors in the context of administrative 
license suspension hearings and have found that while an individual does have a substantial 
interest in his or her license, that interest may be subordinated by the State's interest in preventing 
intoxicated persons from driving, particularly where the individual is entitled to review 
procedures. See Ankney, 109 Idaho at 4-5, 704 P.2d at 336-37 (concluding that the then-
applicable statute, I.C. § 49-352, which enabled a police officer to seize a person's driver's license 
prior to a hearing, did not violate procedural due process because there was not a high risk of 
erroneous deprivation where the statute provided for a prompt post-seizure review, coupled with 
the requirement that the police officer requesting the evidentiary test have reasonable grounds to 
believe the driver is intoxicated); see also In re McNeely, 119 Idaho 182, I90-9 l, 804 P.2d 9I1, 
919-20 (Ct.App. l 990) (concluding that the notice provided by the advisory form, as set forth in 
the applicable statute, did not violate the driver's procedural due process). 
Bellv. Idaho Transp. Dept., 151Idaho659, 262P.3d1030, 1036 (2011). 
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Vehicle based on his failure of two evidentiary tests. That Legislative decision to disqualify Mr. 
Trottier's Commercial driving privileges is not before the Court. 
Mr. Trottier does not have a "substantial right" in a different hearing process without 
offering to the Court a showing of how the hearing should be conducted differently, particularly 
considering that Mr. Trottier had the burden. Myers v. Workmen's Auto Ins. Co. 140 Idaho 495, 
95 P.3d 977 (2004). 
The only alternative implicitly suggested by Mr. Trottier is delaying the Commercial 
Driving License disqualification until the Administrative License Suspension has run its course. 
Mr. Trottier in the worst case would have gone through an appellate court's 
determination that the Administrative License Suspension was a valid "conviction" and then 
several years later would get notice that the Idaho Transportation Department was going to 
disqualify him from the operation of a Commercial vehicle. 
The Idaho Court in Wanner v. State, Dept. of Transp. 150 Idaho 164, 244 P.3d 1250 
(2010), Buell v. Idaho Dept. of Transp. 151 Idaho 257, 254 P.3d 1253 (2011) and now In re 
Williams, ---P.3d---, 2012 WL 3068793 have not found the Idaho Transportation Department's 
process to be unconstitutional. 
Here the Record reflects that Mr. Trottier had Commercial Driving Privileges and failed 
multiple evidentiary tests for breath alcohol. 
Mr. Trottier received an opportunity to be heard, at a reasonable time, in a meaningful 
manner, receiving such process due him Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 US. 319, 335, 96 S. Ct. 893, 
903, 47 L. Ed. 2d 18 (1976). 
Finally, Mr. Trottier requested the District Court take Judicial Notice of the proceedings 
m the Administrative License Suspension case. This action would create a record in the 
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disqualification of Mr. Trottier's Commercial Driving Privileges that does not exist before the 
Department's Hearing Examiner. Without seeking leave to supplement the Record as provided 
for by Idaho Code§ 67-5272, the District Court's enlargement of the Record to include matters 
not considered by the Hearing Examiner would be entirely inappropriate and not supported by 
the Administrative Procedures Act. 
Mr. Trottier has not met his burden. Mr. Trottier has received the process due him. The 
Hearing Examiner's Findings and Conclusions are based on substantial evidence in the record 
and should be confirmed by the Court. Mr. Trottier should be disqualified from the operation of 
a commercial vehicle for his lifetime. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The Appellate Court should issue its Remittitur to the Department to implement the 
administrative action taken by the Department, IRCP 84(t)( 4). 
Upon the reinstatement of the Hearing Examiner's Decision in the Administrative 
License Suspension, the Commercial Driving License Disqualification should also be reinstated. 
Mr. Trottier should suffer an Administrative License Suspension of all of his driving 
privileges, pursuant to I. C. § 18-8002A(7). Mr. Trottier should also suffer a lifetime 
disqualification of his Commercial Driving Privileges pursuant to I.C. § 49-335 retaining the 
remainder of his driving privileges. 
Respectfully Submitted this __ day of August 2012. 
Edwin L. Litteneker 
Special Deputy Attorney General 
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CHAPTER III--FEDERAL MOTOR CARRIER SAFETY ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF 
TRANSPORTATION 
PART 383_COMMERCIAL DRIVER'S LICENSE STANDARDS; REQUIREMENTS AND PENALTIES--Table of Contents 
Subpart D_Driver Disqualifications and Penalties 
Sec. 383.51 Disqualifications of Drivers. 
* * * * * 
(c) • • • 
Table 2 to Sec. 383.51 
If the driver operates a motor 
vehicle and is convicted of: 
For a second 
conviction of any 
combination of 
offenses in this 
Table in a 
separate incident 
within a 3-year 
period while 
operating a CMV, a 
person required to 
have a CDL and a 
CDL holder must be 
disqualified from 
operating a CMV 
for ... 
For a second 
conviction of any 
combination of 
offenses in this 
Table in a 
separate incident 
within a 3-year 
period while 
operating a non-
CMV, a CDL holder 
must be 
disqualified from 
operating a CMV, 
if the conviction 
results in the 
revocation, 
cancellation, or 
suspension of the 
CDL holder's 
license or non-CMV 
driving 
privileges, for . 
. . . 
For a third or 
subsequent 
conviction of any 
combination of 
offenses in this 
Table in a 
separate incident 
within a 3-year 
period while 
operating a CMV, a 
person required to 
have a CDL and a 
CDL holder must be 
disqualified from 
operating a CMV 
for ... 
For a third or 
subsequent 
conviction of any 
combination of 
offenses in this 
Table in a 
separate incident 
within a 3-year 
period while 
operating a non-
CMV, a CDL holder 
must be 
disqualified from 
operating a CMV, 
if the conviction 
results in the 
revocation, 
cancellation, or 
suspension of the 
CDL holder's 
license or non-CMV 
driving 
privileges, for . 
(9) violating a State or local 
law or ordinance on motor 
vehicle traffic control 
prohibiting texting while 
driving.\2\ 
60 days ........... Not applicable .... 120 days .......... Not applicable. 
• • • • * 
\2\ Driving, for the purpose of this disqualification, means operating a commercial motor vehicle, with the 
motor running, including while temporarily stationary because of traffic, a traffic control device, or other 
momentary delays. Driving does not include operating a commercial motor vehicle with or without the motor 
running when the driver has moved the vehicle to the side of, or off, a highway, as defined in 49 CFR 390.5, 
and has halted in a location where the vehicle can safely remain stationary. 
* • * • * 
er, the added text is set forth as follows: [[Page 197]] 
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Electronic Code of Federal Regulations: 
Home Page> Executive Branch > Code of Federal Regulations> Electronic Code of Federal Regulations 
e-CFR Data is current as of January 20, 2012 
Title 49: Transportation 
PART 383-COMMERCIAL DRIVER'S LICENSE SlANDARDS; REQUIREl\IENTS AND PENAL 11ES 
Subpart D-Driver Disqualifications and Penalties 
Browse Next 
§ 383.51 Disqualification of drivers. 
(a) General. (1) A person required to have a CLP or COL Wio is disqualified must not drive a CMV. 
(2) An employer must not knolMngly allow, require, permit, or authorize a dri-.er who is disqualified to 
drive a CMV. 
(3) A holder of a CLP or COL is subj:lct to disqualification sanctions designated in par"!)raphs (b) and (c) 
of this section, ifthe holder drives a CMV or non-CMV and is convicted of the violations listed in th:Jse 
paragraphs. 
(4) Determining first and subsequmt violations. For purposes of determining first and subsequent 
violations of the offenses specified in this subpart, each convction for any offense listed in Tables 1 
through 4 to this section resl.lting from a separate incident, Wiether committed in a CMV or non-CMV, 
must be counted. 
(5) The disqualification period must be in addition to any other previous periods of disqualification. 
(6) Reinstatement after lifetime disqwlification. A State may reinstate any driver disqualified for life for 
offenses described in pcragraphs (b)(1) through (8) ofthis section (Table 1 to §383.51) after 10 years, if 
that person has \Qfuntarily entered and successfJlly completed an appropriate rehabilitation program 
approved by the State. Any person Wlo has been reinstated in accordarce with this provision and Wlo 
is subsequently convicted of a disqualifying offense described in paragraph> (b)(1) through (8) of this 
section (Table 1 to §383.51) must not be reinstated. 
(b) Disqualification for major offenses. Table 1 to §383.51 contains a list ofthe offenses and periods br 
which a person Wio is required to have a CLP or COL is disqualifed, depending upon the type of vehicle 
the driver is operating at the time of the violation, as follows: 
Table 1 to §383.51 
For a first 
conviction 
or refusal to 
be tested 
while 
operating a For a 
CMV second· 
transporting conviction 
Page 1 of 9 
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hazardous or refusal to 
materials be tested in Fora 
required to a separate second 
be incident of conviction 
For a first placarded any or refusal to 
conviction under the combination be tested in 
or refusal to Hazardous of offenses a separate 
be tested Materials in this Table incident of 
while For a first Regulations while any 
operating a conviction (49 CFR part operating a combination 
CMV,a or refusal to 172, subpart CMV,a of offenses 
person be tested F), a person person in this Table 
required to while required to required to while 
have a CLP operating a have a CLP have a CLP operating a 
or COL and non-CMV, a or COL and or COL and non-CMV, a 
a CLP or CLP or COL a CLP or a CLP or CLP or COL 
COL holder holder must COL holder COL holder holder must 
must be be must be must be be 
If a driver disqualified disqualified disqualified disqualified disqualified 
operates a from from from from from 
motor vehicle operating a operating a operating a operating a operating a 
and is CMV for CMV for CMV for CMV for CMV for 
convicted of: * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 






* * * 
(2) Being 1 year 1 year 3 years Life Life. 
under the 
influence of a 
controlled 
substance 
* * * 
(3) Having an 1 year Not 3 years Life Not 
alcohol applicable applicable. 
concentration 
of 0.04 or 
greater while 
operating a 
CMV * * * 
(4) Refusing to 1 year 1 year 3 years Life Life. 
take an 
alcohol test as 
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consent laws 
or regulations 
as defined in 
§383. 72 of this 
part * * * 
(5) Leaving 1 year 1 year 3 years Life Life. 
the scene of 
an accident 
* * * 




than a felony 
described in 
paragraph (b) 
(9) of this table 
* * * 
(7) Driving a 1 year Not 3 years. Life Not 
CMVwhen, as applicable applicable. 









the driver is 
di sq ua lified 
from operating 
aCMV 
(8) Causing a 1 year Not 3 years Life Not 
fatality through applicable applicable. 
the negligent 
operation of a 
CMV, 
including but 
not limited to 







(9) Using the Life-not Life-not Life-not Life-not Life-not 
vehicle in the eligible for eligible for eligible for eligible for eligible for 
commission of 10-year 10-year 10-year 10-year 10-year 
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* * * 
(c) Disqualification for serious traffic viofatiom. Table 2 to §383.51 contains a list ofthe offenses and the 
periods for which a person Wio is required to have a CLP or CDL is disqualifed, depending upon the 
type of vehicle the driver is operating at the time of the violation, as follows: 
Table 2 to §383.51 
For a third or 
For a second subsequent 
conviction of conviction of 
any any 
combination combination 
of offenses in of offenses in 
this Table in a this Table in a 
separate separate 
incident For a third or incident 
For a second within a 3- subsequent within a 3-
conviction of year period conviction of year period 
any while any while 
combination operating a combination operating a 
of offenses non-CMV, a of offenses in non-CMV, a 
in this Table CLP or COL this Table in CLP or COL 
in a separate holder must a separate holder must 
incident be incident be 
within a 3- disqualified within a 3- disqualified 
year period from year period from 
while operating a while operating a 
operating a CMV, if the operating a CMV, if the 
CMV,a conviction CMV,a conviction 
person results in the person results in the 
required to revocation, required to revocation, 
have a CLP cancellation, have a CLP cancellation, 
or COL and a or or COL and a or 
CLP or COL suspension of CLP or COL suspension of 
holder must the CLP or holder must the CLP or 
be COL holder's be COL holder's 
If the driver disqualified license or disqualified license or 
operates a from non-CMV from non-CMV 
motor vehicle operating a driving operating a driving 
and is CMVfor privileges, for CMVfor privileges, for 
convicted of: * * * * * * * * * * * * 
(1) Speeding 
excessively, 
60 days 60_ days 120 days 120 days. 
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involving any 
speed of 24.1 
kmph (15 




(2) Driving 60 days 60 days 120 days 120 days. 
recklessly, as 
defined by 




not limited to, 
offenses of 





the safety of 
persons or 
property 








(5) Violating 60 days 60 days 120 days 120 days. 
State or local 
law relating to 
motor vehicle 
traffic control 





with a fatal 
accident 




(7) Driving a. 60 days Not appli~able 120 days Not applicable. 
CMV without a 
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COL in the 
driver's 
possession 1 
(8) Driving a 60 days Not applicable 120 days Not applicable. 
CMV without 
the proper 
class of COL 
and/or 
endorsements 
for the specific 
vehicle group 
being operated 
or for the 
passengers or 
type of cargo 
being 
transported 
(9) Violating a 60 days Not applicable 120 days Not applicable. 








(10) Violating 60 days Not applicable 120 days Not applicable. 







use of a hand-
held mobile 
telephone 
while driving a 
CMV.2 
1Any individual who provides proof to the enforcement authority that issued the citation, bythe date the 
individual must appear in crurt or pay any fine for such a violation, that the indi\4dual held a valid COL 
on the date the citaticn was issued, shall not be guilty of this offense. 
2 Driving, for the purpose of this disqualification, means operating a commercial motor vehicle on a 
highway, including v.hile temporarily stationary because oftraffic, a traffic control device, or other 
momentary delays. Driving does nct include operating a conmercial motor vehicle when the dri\1er has 
moved the vehicle to the side of, or off, a highway and has halted in a locati01 where the vehicle can 
safely remain stationary. 
(d) Disqualification for railroad-highway grade crossing offenses. Table 3 to §383.51 cortains a list of the 
offenses and the peria:ls for which a person l.\ho is required to ha-.e a CLP or COL is dsqualified, when 
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the driver is operating a CMV at the time of the violation, as follows: 
Table 3 to §383.51 
For a third or 
For a second subsequent 
conviction of any conviction of any 
For a first combination of combination of 
conviction a offenses in this offenses in this 
person Table in a separate Table in a separate 
required to incident within a 3- incident within a 3-
If the driver is have a CLP or year period, a year period, a 
convicted of COL and a CLP person required to person required to 
operating a or COL holder have a CLP or COL have a CLP or COL 
CMVin must be and a CLP or COL and a CLP or COL 
violation of a disqualified holder must be holder must be 
Federal, State from operating disqualified from disqualified from 
or local law a CMV for operating a CMV operating a CMV 
because * * *. * * * for * * * for * * * 
(1) The driver is No less than 60 No less than 120 No less than 1 year. 
not required to days days 
always stop, but 
fails to slow 
down and check 
that tracks are 
clear of an 
approaching 
train * * * 
(2) The driver is No less than 60 No less than 120 No less than 1 year. 
not required to days days 
always stop, but 
fails to stop 
before reaching 
the crossing, if 
the tracks are 
not clear * * * 
(3) The driver is No less than 60 No less than 120 No less than 1 year. 
always required days days 
to stop, but fails 
to stop before 
driving onto the 
crossing * * * 
(4) The driver No less than 60 No less than 120 No less than 1 year. 






stopping * * * 
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(5) The driver No less than 60 No less than 120 No less than 1 year. 
fails to obey a days days 
traffic control 
device or the 
directions of an 
enforcement 
official at the 
crossing * * * 
(6) The driver No less than 60 No less than 120 No less than 1 year. 





clearance * * * 
(e) Disqualification for violating oLi-of-service orders. Table 4 to §383.51 contains a list ofthe offenses 
and periods br which a person who is required to ha-.e a CLP or COL is disqualifed when the driver is 
operating a CM\/ at the time of the violation, as follows: 
TABLE 4 TO §383.51 
For a third or 
For a second subsequent 
For a first conviction in a conviction in a 
conviction separate incident separate incident 
while operating within a 10-year within a 10-year 
a CMV, a period while period while 
person operating a CMV, operating a CMV, 
required to a person a person required 
have a CLP or required to have to have a CLP or 
COL and a CLP a CLP or COL COL and a CLP 
or COL holder and a CLP or or COL holder 
If the driver must be COL holder must must be 
operates a CMV disqualified be disqualified disqualified from 
and is convicted of from operating from operating a operating a CMV 
* * * a CMVfor * * * CMVfor * * * for * * * 
(1) Violating a driver No less than 180 No less than 2 No less than 3 
or vehicle out-of- days or more years or more years or more than 




(2) Violating a driver No less than 1 80 No less than 3 No less than 3 
or vehicle out-of- days or more years or more years or more than 
service order while than 2 years than 5 years 5 years. 
transporting 
hazardous materials 
required to be 
placarded under part 
172, subpart F of 
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this title, or while 
operating a vehicle 
designed to 
transport 16 or more 
passengers, 
including the driver 
[67 FR 49756, July31, 2002, as amended at 68 FR 4396, Jan. 29, 20CB; 72 FR 36787, July5, 2007; 75 
FR 59134, Sept. 27, 2010; 76 FR 26879, M3y 9, 2011; 76 FR 75486, Dec. 4 2011] 
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